Mislim da je spasavanje velikih banaka opravdan potez iz ugla individualnih korisnika. Naime, tačno je da će određen broj spasenih banaka da proba da zloupotrebi federalna sredstva, ali to može samo njima da se obije o glavu. Već su neke spasene banke digle kamate, umesto da ih spuste, u nadi da će doći do većeg profita. Time su direktno prekršile uslove, jer je osnova njihovog spasavanja bilo spasavanje njihovih klijenata. Međutim, ono što je dobro kod tržišta je različitost. Neke banke će, usled oporavka, spustiti kamate, popraviti uslove za građane. One koje to urade imaće više klijenata, a one druge će stagnirati. To, međutim, ne znači da će sredstva uložena u njih propasti. Svi u koje je sad uložen novac u obavezi su da ga sa kamatom vrate državi, odnosno poreskim obveznicima. Sve banke su svesne da ako to ne budu u stanju, efektivno će prestati sa radom. Početni stadijum svake nove pojave je donekle haotičan, pa tako i ovaj prvi stadijum nakon spasavanja. Siguran sam, međutim, da će na dugi rok, banke poučene prethodnim greškama ispraviti svoju politiku i napraviti uslove koji će odgovarati i njima i klijentima. One koje to ne urade svakako će propasti.
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уторак, 16 јун 2009 19:16
The Tao
Otimacina je bila osnova bankarskog sistema i bogacenja. Ovo danas se zove otimacina uz saglasnost ostecenog. Pitanje koje s postavlja je kako ih nije sramota. Lopovi i sramota, he? Po logici kojom amerikanci spasavaju svoj bankarski sistem i industriju svaki gradjanin amerike je morao od Federalne banke dobiti sredstva za svoj licni biznis. Zasto nisu i drugima podelili lovu pa da svi zainteresovani otvore banku a ne samo onima koji su imali i kojima nece nikada faliti. Zast oljude isteruju iz kuca? Covek je ovca, a ni cena mu nije veca.
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четвртак, 18 јун 2009 17:54
stojan nenadović
Banke ne treba spasavati. Treba im zabraniti da stvaraju novi novac izdavanjem kredita iznad iznosa prikupljene štednje. Ako banke budu davale samo onoliko kredita koliko su prikupile novca na štednju, one nikad neće doći u nepriliku. Ali tada od njih neće ni zavisiti količina novca u opticaju. Banke služe samo da čuvaju ušteđevine koje im je neko poverio na čuvanje. I ništa više od toga. O količini novca u opticaju brinuće se država, tako da novca ima tačno onoliko koliko je potrebno, da ne bude ni inflacije ni deflacije, da cene uvek budu apsolutno stabilne. Novac koji bude potreban ulaziće u opticaj kao poklon, tj. kao nekreditni novac. Tako neće kao trošak posebne vrste ulaziti u cenu, nego će biti samo mera nekih drugih troškova. Neće biti prezaduženosti, ni besparice. Novca će biti dovoljno za sve. Moral ljudi će se popraviti. Počeće novo doba.
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четвртак, 18 јун 2009 21:01
Планета
Не знам откуд толико наде у Обаму као да је он малте не неки нови Буда. Неће бити промена у корпоративном бизнису, а и зашто би копрорације и банке оштетиле себе кад располажу са толико моћи да их више никакав "друштвени уговор" не обавезује, нити су у изгледу неке санкције против њих. Држава се на жалост, не понаша као праведан судија, него као орган присиле владајуће класе, као што смо то учили у школи за време социјализма. Капитализам показује своје најружније лице. Давно је речено власт(и моћ, додао бих) кваре, а апсолутна власт (и аполутна моћ) кваре апослутно.
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петак, 19 јун 2009 14:29
Petrushin
My three steps to financial reform - George Soros
/.../
To avert a repetition, the agents must have "skin in the game" but the 5 per cent proposed by the administration is more symbolic than substantive. I would consider 10 per cent as the minimum requirement. To allow for possible discontinuities in markets securities held by banks should carry a higher risk rating than they do under the Basel Accords. Banks should pay for the implicit guarantee they enjoy by using less leverage and accepting restrictions on how they invest depositors' money; they should not be allowed to speculate for their own account with other people's money.
It is probably impractical to separate investment banking from commercial banking as the US did with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. But there has to be an internal firewall that separates proprietary trading from commercial banking. Proprietary trading ought to be financed out of a bank's own capital. If a bank is too big to fail, regulators must go even further to protect its capital from undue risk....
Finally, I have strong views on the regulation of derivatives. The prevailing opinion is that they ought to be traded on regulated exchanges. That is not enough. The issuance and trading of derivatives ought to be as strictly regulated as stocks. Regulators ought to insist that derivatives be homogenous, standardised and transparent.
Custom-made derivatives only serve to improve the profit margin of the financial engineers designing them. In fact, some derivatives ought not to be traded at all. I have in mind credit default swaps. Consider the recent bankruptcy of AbitibiBowater and thatof General Motors. In both cases, some bondholders owned CDS and stood to gain more by bankruptcy than by reorganisation. It is like buying life insurance on someone else's life and owning a licence to kill him. CDS are instruments of destruction that ought to be outlawed.
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/.../
To avert a repetition, the agents must have "skin in the game" but the 5 per cent proposed by the administration is more symbolic than substantive. I would consider 10 per cent as the minimum requirement. To allow for possible discontinuities in markets securities held by banks should carry a higher risk rating than they do under the Basel Accords. Banks should pay for the implicit guarantee they enjoy by using less leverage and accepting restrictions on how they invest depositors' money; they should not be allowed to speculate for their own account with other people's money.
It is probably impractical to separate investment banking from commercial banking as the US did with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. But there has to be an internal firewall that separates proprietary trading from commercial banking. Proprietary trading ought to be financed out of a bank's own capital. If a bank is too big to fail, regulators must go even further to protect its capital from undue risk....
Finally, I have strong views on the regulation of derivatives. The prevailing opinion is that they ought to be traded on regulated exchanges. That is not enough. The issuance and trading of derivatives ought to be as strictly regulated as stocks. Regulators ought to insist that derivatives be homogenous, standardised and transparent.
Custom-made derivatives only serve to improve the profit margin of the financial engineers designing them. In fact, some derivatives ought not to be traded at all. I have in mind credit default swaps. Consider the recent bankruptcy of AbitibiBowater and thatof General Motors. In both cases, some bondholders owned CDS and stood to gain more by bankruptcy than by reorganisation. It is like buying life insurance on someone else's life and owning a licence to kill him. CDS are instruments of destruction that ought to be outlawed.
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